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WORLD
POLICY JOURNAL
ARTICLE:
Volume XV, No 3, FALL 1998
Reagan Redux:
The Enduring Myth of Star Wars
William D. Hartung
America is
in the midst of a full-fledged,bipartisan bout of nostalgia for
the glory days of Ronald Reagan. The signs are everywhere.
On the Democratic side,President Clinton has decided to kick "unworthy"
single mothers off welfare.On the Republican side, there is the
"Contract With America," a hodgepodge of Reaganite ideas that is
capped by the suggestion that we move with alldue haste to deploy
Reagan's favorite weapons scheme, the Star Wars missiledefense systemówhether
it works or not.
In addition,
the Gipper has had large machines and sprawling tractsof infrastructure
named after him. For weapons buffs, there is the RonaldReagan aircraft
carrier, which could end up as the most expensivecombat ship
ever built. And for anyone who can still scrape up the changeto
fly the shuttle from New York to Washington, there is the
bracingexperience of hearing the pilot say, "We are now beginning
our descentinto Ronald Reagan National Airport." What are we to
make of this longingfor the return of the Reaganesque? Is it just
that we want a "reassuring"presence back at the helmósomeone who,
like Reagan, could run up the biggest budget deficits in the
history of the Republic and still maintain his reputationas a fiscal
conservative? Or have we simply exhausted the possibilitiesof `60s
and `70s nostalgia, so that it is now time for the 1980s to haveits
moment in the sun?
Perhaps we can
begin to answer these questions by examining the fateof one of the
more expensive bits of Reagan memorabilia, the StrategicDefense
Initiative (SDI), popularly known as the Star Wars program. Reagan'sdream
of a high-tech shield to protect against incoming ballistic missilesis
alive and well. The original Star Wars visionóa multi-tiered systemof
weapons and sensors that could simultaneously destroy thousands
of Sovietmissilesóhas been superseded by the more modest goal of
protecting thenation against an accidental missile launch by China
or Russia, or deliberateattacks by so-called rogue states like Iran,
Iraq, and North Korea (noneof which currently have missiles that
can reach U.S. soil). In keepingwith this diminished mission,
the 1990s version of Reagan's dream has beenrenamed the Ballistic
Missile Defense (BMD) program. Like the B-2 bomber,which House Budget
Committee chairman John Kasich has dubbed the "Draculaweapon" for
its remarkable ability to escape the budget cutter's ax, theStar
Wars program is currently rolling merrily along, impervious to technicalglitches,
cost overruns, and massive shifts in the geopolitical landscape.
This aspect of the Star Wars projectóitsproponents' unflappable
optimism, coupled with a stubborn disregard ofhard factsómakes it
the perfect monument to Ronald Reagan.
Star Wars:
Impotent and Obsolete?
The most remarkable thing about Reagan's Star Wars plan, which wasannounced
with great fanfare in March 1983 with the ambitious goal of renderingnuclear
weapons "impotent and obsolete," is how consistently it has failedto
meet virtually every performance goal that has been set out for
it.Many of the weapons that were to make up Reagan's ambitious "astrodome"defense,
such as Dr. Edward Teller's highly touted x-ray lasers and particlebeamweapons,
proved to be uniquely unsuited to the task at hand. As strategicexperts
John Pike, Bruce Blair, and Stephen Schwartz observe in their pathbreakingnew
study, Atomic Audit: The Costs and Consequences of U.S. Nuclear
Weapons Since 1940, "the greatest accomplishment of the first fouryears
of the SDI program consisted in learning what technologies did notwork.
At the beginning, the program contemplated a bewildering array ofdevices
that might be of use in shooting down missiles and warheads. Butmost
of these gadgets, such as railguns, space-based radars, lasers,
andparticle beams, were found wanting."1
The problems
with the original Star Wars vision went beyond the failureof individual
components to meet minimum performance requirements. Thewhole concept
was fatally flawed. As Canadian computer expert David Parnaspointed
out just two years after Reagan's 1983 Star Wars speech, managinga
battle that would involve targeting tens of thousands of incoming
missiles,warheads, and decoys without error is beyond the capability
of any computersoftware system. Even a .1 percent failure rate in
intercepting incomingnuclear weapons could mean the annihilation
of one or more major Americancities. Parnas was so convinced of
the futility of the Star Wars plan thathe resigned his position
as a member of SDI's battle management advisory panel.That same
year, in 1985, the physicists David Wright and Lisbeth Gronlundorganized
a campaign in which over 7,200 scientists and engineers signeda
"pledge of non-participation" in Star Wars research on the
grounds that it was a fraudulent and dangerous program.This was
all the more remarkable when one considers that the Pentagon wasoffering
to give university-based scientists millions of dollars in researchfunds
to explore missile defense technologies.2
The daunting
technical obstacles to fielding an effective missile defensecombined
with the end of the Cold War to cool the U.S. government's ardorfor
Reagan's Star Wars plan. By the early 1990s, missile defense was
anafterthought on the nation's security agenda. Yet the Pentagon
and themilitary services have continued to pour research and development
moneydown the drain in the quixotic quest for missile defenses.
According toStephen Schwartz of the Brookings Institution, the United
States has spent$55 billion on missile defense in the 15 years since
Reagan launched SDI,with precious little to show for it.3
Thefact that the goal of the program is now far less ambitious
than Reagan'soriginal vision of an impenetrable shield that would
protect against thousandsof incoming missiles has not measurably
improved its potential for success.Blocking a few stray missiles
should be easier than blunting a coordinatedattack involving tens
of thousands of warheads. But to borrow a phrasethat Lockheed Martin's
chairman Norman Augustine used in a different context,the missile
defense program is still "unblemished by success."
As Bradley Graham
of the Washington Post reported in a front-page articlethat ran
on April 27 of this year, the best known Star Wars component,a "hit-to-kill"
vehicle designed to intercept incoming missiles well beforethey
reach U.S. territory, has failed in seven of nine tests conductedin
this decade.4 Meanwhile, Lockheed Martin's Theater High Altitude
AreaDefense (THAAD) program, a sort of super Patriot missile designed
to defendagainst medium-range ballistic missiles, is zero for five
in tests conductedto date.5
A panel of independent
experts appointed by the Pentagon and headedby former air force
chief of staff Larry Welch warned in a report issuedthis past February
that the entire ballistic missile defense effort wason a headlong
"rush to failure" because of pressure by Congress to deploya system
before adequate testing has been done.6The Welch Commission's
warnings echo those issued nearly 20 years ago bythe outgoing secretary
of defense, Harold Brown, to the incoming Reaganadministration regarding
the over hyped missile defense efforts of thatera.
But the issue
of whether or not Star Wars can actually work does notappear to
be uppermost in the thinking of its proponents. In August 1993,Tim
Weiner of the New York Times revealed that the army had rigged a
key1984 Star Wars test by planting a remote-controlled explosive
in the targetmissile that would cause it blow up on cue whether
or not it was hit bythe interceptor missile. When Weiner revealed
this monstrous deception,former Reagan administration officials
argued that it was more importantfor the Soviets to believe that
we could intercept missiles in flight thanit was for the United
States to actually have had the capability to do so.7Of
course, if we were to take such thinking to its logicalextreme,
the United States could today build a cheap "Potemkin" missiledefense
system under the auspices of Steven Spielberg and George Lucas,never
mind Boeing and Lockheed Martin.
It is hard to
see how we could do worse. We are spending $4 billiona year, year
in and year out, for a ballistic missile defense effort thathas
yet to deploy or successfully test a single reliable device. In
fact,the most impressive products to come out of our $55 billion,
15year investmentin missile defenses to date are the flashy "artist's
conceptions" of howfuture systems might work, which the military
services and defense contractorsduly trot out whenever Congress
threatens to cut back the Star Wars budgetby a few hundred million
dollars.
Dole, Gingrich,
Lott and Star Wars Revival
If Star Wars was a domestic program, it would have long since beenslashed
to pieces by conservative budget cutters looking for money to payfor
tax cuts and budgetary deficit reductions. But as often happens
in the warped world of national securitythinking, the program has
"failed upward" to the point where it may wellend up being deployed,
whether we need it or not.
The latest push
for deployment of Star Wars has its roots in Speakerof the House
Newt Gingrich's master plan, the Contract With America, whichwas
modestly subtitled, "The Bold Plan by Rep. Newt Gingrich, Rep. DickArmey,
and the House of Representatives to Change the Nation." Under theheading"Strong
National Defense," Gingrich and Armey's "bold plan" of 1994 calledfor
"renewing America's commitment to an effective national missile
defenseby requiring the Defense Department to deploy antiballistic
missile systemscapable of defending the United States against ballistic
missile attack."8
However, Gingrich
and Armey's Star Wars plans suffered a surprisingsetback in the
summer of 1996, when fiscal conservatives of both partiesjoined
hands with liberal Democrats in the House of Representatives todefeat
an amendment that would have mandated deployment of a missile defensesystem
by as early as the year 2000. The decisive factor in stalling Gingrichand
Armey's forced march to deployment was a Congressional Budget Officeanalysis
that reminded members that even a modest ballistic missile defensesystem
could cost tens of billions of dollars.9
Star Wars fared
no better in the brief cameo appearance it made in BobDole's ill-fated
1996 presidential campaign. When Dole tried to whip upfear in California
over the dangers of Chinese missiles raining down onLos Angeles,
his rhetorical exertions were greeted with a collective yawnby Californians
who were more concerned about the state's floundering economy.
After falling
flat in the House and on the presidential campaign trail,interest
in ballistic missile defenses has now shifted to the Senate, whereMississippi
senator Thad Cochran's Defend America Act has 50 cosponsors.An attempt
to pass Cochran's billówhich mandates deployment of a limitedantiballistic
missile system by the year 2003ófailed in May of this year,when
Star Wars boosters could not muster the 60 votes needed to bring
themeasure to the Senate floor. In a chilling display of party unity,
however,all 55 Republican senators voted to bring the bill to the
floor, whereit would have passed without difficulty.10The
antiñStar Wars coalition is stronger in the House, so even if Cochranand
Majority Leader Trent Lott succeed in ramming through a Senate billin
support of their goal to see missile defenses deployed by 2003,
theHouse should be able to block the bill in a House-Senate conference.
Despite their
recent political setbacks, Star Wars boosters are spoilingfor a
fight over missile defense. In an excellent article by Carla AnneRobbins
that ran in the Wall Street Journal on August 7 of this year, RepublicanNational
Committee chairman Jim Nicholson identifies missile defenses as"the
most important [security] issue of the 2000 election." In addition,Robbins
reports, Jack Kemp's Empower America organization is trying towin
over some members of the Senate to the cause by running proñStar
Warsradio ads in targeted states like Nevada. Listeners are told:
"We are onlyone vote shy of ensuring the safety of you and your
family. But the peoplestanding in the way are Nevada's own
senators."
For a project
so technically deficient to get this close to receivingthe go-ahead
for deployment suggests that there is more going on here thanmeets
the eye. Indeed, the Star Wars program is driven by deep psychological,political,
and economic factors that have made it extremely difficult tostop
simply on the merits of the program itself.
Soothing
Our Fears: America Invulnerable?
As a nation that has been largely spared foreign intervention or
theoccupation of its own soil, the United States has developed
an approach to nationalsecurity that is too often based on the unrealistic
expectation that wecan find a foolproofótechnical or politicalófix
that can protect us inany and every worst-case scenario. This quest
for "absolute security,"which James Chace and Caleb Carr analyzed
in some detail ten years agoin their book, America Invulnerable,
is a fundamental pillar of the StarWars vision.11
When Ronald
Reagan decided to take the advice of the scientists, soldiers,and
businessmen who were pushing the Star Wars planóled by H-bomb inventorEdward
Teller and retired army general Daniel O. Graham, and amply financedby
right-wing business leaders like Joseph Coorsóhis primary concern
wasto make the American public feel safe from the horrors of a nuclear
attack.12 The only truly effective courseógetting
rid of nuclear weaponsódidnot appeal to Reagan and his inner circle
at that point, at least not inthe manner put forward by the European
Nuclear Disarmament (END) movementand the U.S.-based Nuclear Weapons
Freeze campaign. Instead, Reagan optedto seek a technical "solution"
to our nuclear vulnerability by pursuinga multi-tiered antimissile
system, which, if fully deployed, could havecost up to $1 trillion.13
George Keyworth,an Edward Teller protégé who served
as Reagan's science advisor,told television journalist Bill Moyers
in 1984 that Reagan was extremelyconcerned about the nuclear freeze
initiative, and that he wanted to respondby doing something that
would "give people some hope" that they would notbe incinerated
in a nuclear holocaust. Reagan's March 1983 Star Wars speech,with
its grand promises to render nuclear weapons "impotent and obsolete"and
to change "the course of human history," was the first salvo in
theReagan administration's campaign to put a positive spin on the
nucleararms race.14
It may be possible
to give the public false hope by offering it a technicalfix to the
nuclear threat, à la Star Wars, though it would be safer,albeit
more difficult, to address the problem directly by drastically reducingthe
world's nuclear arsenals. As the nuclear tests in India and Pakistan,and
Iran's test this past summer of a mid-range ballistic missile, beginto
attract media attention to the nuclear threat for the first time
sincethe end of the Cold War, the question will be whether the public
will succumbto the reassuring (but false) promise of a technical
fix to the problemof nuclear weapons.
Defending
against Rogue States
The latest turn in the Star Wars debate comes courtesy of former
Fordadministration secretary of defense Donald Rumsfeld, who chaired
a congressionallymandated panel that announced with great
fanfare this past July that such "rogue states"as North Korea, Iran,
and Iraq may be as little as 5 years away from developingmissiles
that could reach U.S. soil, not the 10 to 12 years that officialU.S.
intelligence estimates have been suggesting. When the unclassifiedsummary
of the report was released to the public, Newt Gingrich, the primarypolitical
sponsor of the Rumsfeld panel, launched into rhetorical overkill,describing
the findings as "the most important warning about our nationalsecurity
since the end of the Cold War."15
The Rumsfeld
report was treated with undue respect by most of the nation'seditors
and reporters. Few of the published accounts of the panel's findingsbothered
to point out that several key players involved in this allegedlyobjective
exercise are heavily invested in the Star Wars project, politicallyand
economically. Rumsfeld himself was the chair of Bob Dole's failed
1996presidential bid, which tried to push Star Wars on a largely
uninterestedpublic. More important, Rumsfeld works closely with
the Center forSecurity Policy, a proñStar Wars think tank
run by Frank Gaffney, a formerPentagon official in the Reagan administration,
who has devoted his postgovernmentcareer to spreading the Star Wars
creed. The center has received over $1million in donations from
companies such as Boeing and Lockheed Martin(both major beneficiaries
of Star Wars research funds).
Newt Gingrich
and Trent Lott, who also pushed for the Rumsfeld panel,are both
firmly on record in favor of deploying a missile defense system
as soon as possible.Lott has already managed to get one of the Star
Wars laser programs movedto his state. Gingrich, a longtime Star
Wars booster, has helped make surethat Congress annually appropriates
roughly a billion research dollarsmore than the Pentagon asks foróto
the direct benefit of Lockheed Martin,which maintains a major facility
in Marietta, Georgia, just outside theSpeaker's district.16
One would have
thought that self-respecting journalists would have consideredthe
source before uncritically trumpeting the Rumsfeld panel's findings.The
most embarrassing puff piece on the Rumsfeld report came in mid-July,when
television talk show host Charlie Rose aired a shamelessly unbalancedpresentation
featuring Rumsfeld and fellow Republican panelist Paul Wolfowitz,with
no one on the other side of the debate present. Rose echoed the
toneof controlled hysteria inherent in the Rumsfeld report by repeating
Gingrich's"warning" remark several times during the broadcast. In
essence, the segmentwas an infomercial for the Lott/Gingrich/Rumsfeld
view of the looming threatfrom Third World missiles.
If a Charlie
Rose, with a research staff at his disposal, can fall forthe Star
Wars myth, what chance does the general public have of sortingfact
from fiction? On the heels of the Rumsfeld report, the RepublicanNational
Committee (RNC) announced the results of a poll that asked peoplewhether
or not they wanted to be defended from a Chinese missile attack.Not
surprisingly, the RNC's loaded question yielded the intended response:75
percent of those polled said they wanted to be defended from ChineseICBMs.
Of course, poll-driven
foreign policy discussions have grave weaknesses,the most important
being that they fail to provide citizens with the minimalfactual
information they need to make informed decisions. The reason Chinawill
not attack the United States with nuclear missiles is the same nowas
it was two decades agoóbecause the minute it did so, China would
beexposed to a totally devastating counterattack. The same would
hold truefor North Korea, Iraq, or Iran, should they ever actually
acquire the necessarytechnology to mount a weapon of mass destruction
on a bomb that could reachU.S. soil.
In fact, neither
of the two main reasons that Rumsfeld offered in explainingU.S.
vulnerability to an attack from Third World ballistic missilesótheavailability
of technical assistance from other countries and the possibilityof
a "sneak attack" from a country with a clandestine missile developmentprogramóhold
up to scrutiny.
How Should
America Respond?
On this very issue of foreign assistance to countries seeking the
meansto deliver weapons of mass destruction, the United States
has been part of theproblem, not part of the solution. U.S. sales
of advanced F-16 fighterjets to Pakistan have provided that nation
with a reliable, reusable meansof delivering a crude nuclear device,
whether or not its much vaunted missileprogram ever succeeds. And
when President Bush broke a decade-old pledgeto China by selling
150 F-16s to Taiwan during the 1992 presidential campaign,he did
irreparable harm to U.S. security relations with Beijing, makingit
that much harder for Washington to ride herd on China's transfers
ofmissile technology to Pakistan, Syria, and other customers of
ill repute.
More recently,
as we have now learned in connection with the ongoingWhite House
fundraising scandals, the Clinton administration has made itmuch
easier for companies like Loral and Hughes Electronics (both major
contributors of soft money to the Democratic Party) to transfer
satellitetechnology and services to China, some of which has helped
Beijing improvethe accuracy of its ballistic missiles. Therefore,
if Rumsfeld and othersbelieve that foreign technology transfers
are driving the Third World missilethreat, their first priority
should be to get the U.S. government to tightenup its own policy
on exports of missile-related technologies. Only thencan we credibly
press countries like China and Russia to curb their owndangerous
exports of missile and nuclear weapons components.17
As for the "sneak
attack" argument, it is even weaker upon examinationthan the foreign
assistance argument. As Paul Wolfowitz put the case to Charlie Rose,a
closed society like North Korea might possibly be able to hide an
entireballistic missile development effort up to the moment of the
first test,after which point that nation could be ready to launch
a missile attackon the United States within six months.
Wolfowitz's
scenario is farfetched for many reasons. First and foremost,unless
a foreign leader is on a suicide mission, there is no logic to usinga
single ballistic missile (or even a handful of them) to attack the
UnitedStates. If the leaders of Iraq or North Korea were to take
such a foolishstep, all they would accomplish would be to announce
to the world wherethe attack came fromóunlike concealing a bomb
in a suitcase, it is notpossible to hide the origination point of
a ballistic missile launch. Havingmade that announcement (and used
up its stockpile of ballistic missilesin the process), the aggressor
nation would then be completely unable todefend itself from a U.S.
counterattack using nuclear or conventional bombs.
Moreover, it
is quite likely that any attempt by a Third World "roguestate" to
develop ballistic missiles that could reach the United Stateswould
be stopped long before a system could be deployed. After its firsttest,
the nation in question would most likely face a preemptive strikeagainst
its missile production facilities (unlike research sites, suchfacilities
would be extremely difficult to hide). Thus, the "sneak attack"rational
for Star Wars is wholly implausible. Furthermore, as Rumsfeldpanel
member Richard Garwin noted in an op-ed piece in the New York Times,no
defensive system currently under consideration could completely
neutralizethe threat posed by even a small number of ballistic missiles.
Garwin rightlyobserves that "the best way to defend against possible
attack is to preventcountries like North Korea, Iran, and Iraq from
getting these missilesin the first place."18
Missile development
efforts in the Third World are much more worrisomefor their regional
security implications than for their purported threatto the American
homeland. The fact that Iran has recently tested a missilethat can
reach Israel is a real security concern, as is the nascent racebetween
India and Pakistan to test nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles.But
these regional threats could be more easily addressed with a robustresearch
program on defenses against medium-range missiles that would costno
more than $500 million to $1 billion per yearóa small fraction of
thebloated $4 billion per year now going for Star Wars research.
But, of course,a focus on the real threats would hardly be enough
to keep the Boeingsand Lockheed Martins feeding at the Pentagon
trough in the style to whichthey have become accustomed.
If we want to
avoid burdening our children and grandchildren with anunworkable,
dangerous, and immensely costly project, the time to starteducating
ourselves and our fellow citizens about the costs of the StarWars
program is now. Even without a full grasp of the technical issuesinvolved,
most people know a boondoggle when they see one. If the technicalfiascoes
and special interest politics behind the Star Wars facade wereto
become common knowledge, this program could be relegated to the
dustbin of history where it belongs.
In the meantime,
anyone who wants to promote Ronald Reagan's legacyshould consider
his more constructive contributions to nuclear weaponspolicy, such
as pressing for the elimination of nuclear missiles from Europeor
signing the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START)óthe first nucleararms
control agreement in history to actually reduce the number of nuclearweapons
in the stockpiles of the superpowers. As Jonathan Schell has pointedout
in his recent book, The Gift of Time, with respect to nuclear weapons,Ronald
Reagan was the "most fervently abolitionist president of the ColdWar
period."19 So if we must pay homageto Ronald Reagan,
let us honor Reagan the nuclear abolitionist, not Reaganthe Star
Warrior.
Notes
This article is adapted from a study of the Star Wars lobby that
will be released by the World Policy Institute later this
year.
1. John
Pike, Bruce Blair, and Stephen I. Schwartz, "Defendingagainst the
Bomb," in Atomic Audit: The Costs and Consequences of U.S. NuclearWeapons
Since 1940, ed., Stephen I. Schwartz (Washington, D.C.: Brookings,
1998), p. 291.
2. Interview with David Wright, July 30, 1998; the author
isin possession of a copy of the "pledge of non-participation"
that was circulated in1985/86; see also Charles Mohr, "Scientist
Quits Antimissile Panel Saying Task Is Impossible," NewYork Times,
July 12, 1985, cited in Schwartz, ed., Atomic Audit, p. 291.
3. Figure provided by Stephen I. Schwartz, based on his estimatesin
Atomic Audit, and on more recent missile defense expenditures.
4. Bradley Graham, "Antimissile Program's Bumpy Path," WashingtonPost,
April 27, 1998.
5. "Missile Defense System Fails," Associated Press, May 12,1998.
6. Report of the Panel on Reducing Risk in Missile Defense
FlightTest Programs (Welch Commission), February 27, 1998.
The full text of thisreport is available on the worldwide
web via the home page of the Space Policy Project of theFederation
of American Scientists (www.fas.org/spp/starwars/program/welch/welch1.html).
7. Tim Weiner, "Lies and Rigged `Star Wars' Test Fooled the
Kremlin,and Congress," New York Times, August 18, 1993; cited
in Schwartz, ed.,Atomic Audit, p. 295.
8. Contract With America: The Bold Plan by Rep. Newt Gingrich,Rep.
Dick Armey, and the House Republicans to Change the Nation
(New York: TimesBooks, 1994), p. 93.
9. Budgetary Implications of S1635óThe Defending America Actof
1996 (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Budget Office, May 17,
1996); seealso, "Star Wars, the Sequel," New York Times, August
7, 1996.
10. For a summary of the recent debate in the Senate, see
William D. Hartung, "Spacey Missile Defense," The Nation,
July 27/August 3, 1998.
11. James Chace and Caleb Carr, America Invulnerable: The
Quest for Absolute Security from 1812 to Star Wars (New York:
Summit Books, 1988).
12. On the genesis of Star Wars, see Gregg Herken, "The Earthly
Origins of Star Wars," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,
October 1987; for the definitive account of Edward Teller's
role, see William J. Broad, Teller's War: The Top-Secret Story Behind
the Star Wars Deception (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992).
13. Schwartz, ed., Atomic Audit, p. 291, n. 61. 14.
Reagan's speech is cited in Herken, "The Earthly Originsof Star
Wars," p 20.
15. Jessica Webster and Patrick J. Sloyan, "Panel Gauges a
MissileThreat," Newsday, July 16, 1998.
16. Information on the Center for Security Policy and its
links to Donald Rumsfeld is drawn from the center's 1996 annual
report. On Gingrichand Lockheed, see William D. Hartung, "The
Speaker from Lockheed?" The Nation, January 30, 1995.
17. For a fuller version of the argument on the need for the
United States to take preventive action against nuclear proliferation,
see William D. Hartung,"Hypocrisy Paves the Way for Bomb Tests,"
Newsday, June 18, 1998.
18. Richard L. Garwin, "Keeping Enemy Missiles at Bay," New
York Times, July 28, 1998.
19. Jonathan Schell, The Gift of Time: The Case for Abolishing
Nuclear Weapons Now (New York: Metropolitan Books, 1998),
p. 15.
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